INTRODUCTION
The Thirteenth Amendment's promise of relief from "slavery [and] involuntary servitude"' has borne little fruit, unlike its contemporaneous kin the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 2 The impotence of an Amendment drafted to remedy the economic subjugation of AfricanAmericans is ironic in light of the persistent income gap between races. 3 This Note analyzes a rare instance of expansive Thirteenth Amendment articulation-cases involving peonage. 4 These cases diverged from the Progressive Era pattern ofjudicial hostility to minority claims, 5 while having only a limited impact on the quotidian reality of race relations. 6 This Note argues that these cases' divergence from their era's racial hostility and their limited impact can be explained by viewing them as instances of "interest convergence," wherein the dominant (white) ideology informing the court happened to coincide with the needs of black workers. 7 In Derrick Bell's words, " [t] he interest of blacks in achieving racial equality [is] accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites." 8 Specifically, the Supreme Court pressed the Thirteenth Amendment into the service of liberty of contract doctrine to solve a pressing ideological problem.
The ideological crisis addressed in cases involving peonage arose from a disjunction between the era's liberty of contract ideology and its economic realities: At the close of the nineteenth century, rapid industrialization, increasing concentration of capital, and a shrinking share of returns for labor produced industrial unrest and periodic depression. 9 Claims that wage labor was coercive were pervasive, often being invoked to justify redistributive legislation.
1 0 Laborers claimed to be coerced by the wage labor system;"' women claimed to be coerced by their physical frailty. 12 The pervasiveness of coercion rhetoricjarred with the dominant vision of liberty of contract as the sine qua non of fair and just social ordering.' 3 Courts struggled to restrain legislative redistribution, to limit claims of economic coercion, and to preserve laissez-faire's ideological coherence. Relying on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 5. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (noting that segregation may "stamp[ ] the colored race with a badge of inferiority" solely because "the colored 'race' chooses to put that construction upon it"); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (implying that the time had come when blacks "cease[ ] to be the special favorite of the laws").
6. See infra note 235 and accompanying text. 11. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (invalidating a Kansas law that prohibited employers from requiring that workers promise not to join a union).
12. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 416 (1908) (validating a statute that restricted the number of hours women could work).
13. See infra Part I.B.
the latter. Both laws were mere cogs in a complex machinery of "customs and laws" designed to retain cheap labor for turpentine farms, cotton farms, and railway construction. 23 Both continued de facto slavery. In both cases, the Court struck down state law components of this system on grounds that resembled rationales used in laissez-faire jurisprudence.
Part I of this Note outlines the historical context of the Peonage cases, sketching conditions in the labor market and focusing on the South. The laissez-faire theory of limited government is then outlined. Part II reviews Lochner-era substantive due process cases concerning women and white laborers to illuminate judicial understandings of coercion. Changing judicial attitudes toward women illustrate the culturally contingent nature of market baselines. The final Part analyzes the Peonage cases as products of the same notion of coercion, again hinging on the Justices' understanding of African-Americans' place in the labor market. Examination of a contemporary Thirteenth Amendment case suggests that traces of this framework persist.
4 I. BUILDING THE FREE MARKET IN PRACTICE AND IN THEORY
This Part sketches post-Civil War labor relations. The jurisprudential framework used to understand economic legislation, as it evolved from Thomas Cooley and Christopher Tiedeman to the courts, is then examined. Judicial theory diverged from the reality of the labor market because of the prevalence of coerced (non-voluntary) transactions in the 23. Daniel, Shadow of Slavery, supra note 18, at ix; see also id. at 21-22 (discussing prevalence of peonage through the entire South, and the difficulties inhering in measuring its spread); Martha A. Myers, Race, Labor, & Punishment in the New South 225-27 (1998) (comparing trends in incarceration of blacks and whites in Georgia between the Civil War and the Second World War to conclude that "punishment of black men.., was more firmly linked than comparable white punishments to economic events and conditions"). Another instance of oppressive labor law was the convict lease system, whereby blacks arrested on minor offenses were hired out by the state as cheap labor. See Alex Lichtenstein, Twice the Work of Free Labor: The Political Economy of Convict Labor in the New South 10-12 (1996); see also Myers, supra, at 15-21 (describing the growth of the convict lease system in Georgia after the Civil War); Oshinsky, supra note 22, at 70-84 (describing convict leasing in Tennessee, Florida, and Alabama in coal mines and turpentine farms).
24. Alternative jurisprudential models are not considered at length here as extensive discussion exists elsewhere. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Remember the Thirteenth, 10 Const. Comment. 403, 407 (1993) ( arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment should not be subject to a state action requirement and that it should apply "when private economic power is used in racially perverse ways"); 
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A. Postbellum Economic Development 1. Labor Unrest and "Wage Slavery" in Northern Industry. -War's close and Reconstruction witnessed an expansion in the North's economy and the growth of a "powerful class of industrialists and railroad entrepreneurs."
2 5 Radical Republicanism, with roots in antebellum Free Labor and Free Soil parties, prospered momentarily, 2 6 but soon foundered as the Republican Party drifted from the principles of Southern Reconstruction toward a pro-business liberalism. 27 Disillusioned by well-publicized corruption, particularly in Southern Reconstruction regimes, "liberal reformers who had once exalted the power of the activist state.., attacked the 'fallacy of attempts to benefit humanity by legislation.' 28 When the Northern Pacific Railroad's financial problems triggered the 1870s depression, labor unrest accelerated, culminating in the Great Strike of 25 . Foner, Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 460. By 1873, the nation's industrial production stood 75% above its 1865 level, a figure all the more remarkable in view of the South's economic stagnation.... By 1873, with the United States second only to Britain in manufacturing production and the number of farmers outstripped by nonagricultural workers, the North had irrevocably entered the industrial age. Id. at 461. This is not, however, to suggest that industrial development was taking place solely in the North or that agricultural activities were confined to the South. See id. 27. See Foner, Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 466, 500 (noting the reforms that took place within the Republican Party that precipitated the "growing connection of Republican leaders with business corporations"); see also 31. See Horwitz, supra note 30, at 65-66. 32. The Northern urban press, according to Foner, described labor leaders as "'enemies of society' . . . . and insisted the laws of political economy dictated only one way out of the depression: 'Things must regulate themselves.'" Foner, Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 517-19. The urban bourgeoisie, which was moving rapidly to the right, welcomed the Depression as "'not an unmixed evil' since it promised to lower wages, discipline labor, and curb the power of unions." Id. at 518.
33. See Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, supra note 3, at 26 (noting that "the Labor question eclipsed the Slavery Question in the politics of the rapidly industrializing postbellum North"). 37. Although real wages rose in this period, monetary deflation and falling prices meant that "much of the working class remained desperately poor." Id. at 117. According ery. 38 Just as the Nation celebrated free labor's triumph over feudal relations, legislatures and courts were flooded with allegations of a fresh mode of servitude resulting directly from free markets: Industrial workers saw their working conditions as "wage slavery," wherein "the 'lash of gold' fell not on 'one slave alone,' but on 'the backs of millions.'" 9 White workers articulated this fear of becoming slaves through racial violence: In strikes and racial programs, white workers, such as longshoremen on the New York City docks, would attempt to purge theirjobs of the "'taint of blackness"' by "driv [ing] blacks from the labor market altogether and, in the process, redefin[ing] the jobs they appropriated as 'white." 40 The labor regulations challenged in cases such as Lochner, 41 Coppage, 42 and Adair 4 3 responded to such ferment in the labor market by attempting to ameliorate the inequitable distribution of surplus profits between labor and capital.
2. Persistent Unfree Labor in the South. -In parts of the South, 44 unfree forms of labor flourished alongside racial violence and disenfranchisement. 45 Postbellum labor relations in many parts of the South to Foner, the depressions of the 1870s and 1890s affected the poor particularly harshly. See id. at 121.
38. This tradition finds foundations in the hopes inspired by the Thirteenth Amendment's passage. "Labor spokesmen referred to the Thirteenth Amendment as a 'glorious labor amendment' that enshrined the dignity of labor in the Constitution and whose prohibition of involuntary servitude was violated by court injunctions undermining the right to strike." Id. at 124-27 (discussing in addition the resurgence of discussions of "wage slavery"). Indeed, the drafters of the Thirteenth Amendment had argued that "the degradation of one worker was the degradation of all working people." Vandervelde, supra note 3, at 445.
39. Amy Dru Stanley, From Bondage to Contract: Wage Labor, Marriage, and the Market in the Age of Slave Emancipation 84-86 (1998) (internal citations omitted). Stanley notes that labor activists refined the abolitionist critique of slavery, arguing against freedom of contract that "a man with his labor cannot be bought and sold, without recognizing slavery as a right." Id. at 90 (internal citations omitted); see also Foner, Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 477-79 (noting that union campaigns focused on "wage slavery"); Foner, Story of Freedom, supra note 36, at 143 (noting that the term "wage slavery" was in popular currency at least until 1919); Forbath, Ambiguities, supra note 27, at 813-14 ("The Reconstruction legislation and amendments affirmed that the condition of a laboring class was of constitutional moment. .. ").
40 thus approximated slavery in substance, if not in legal form. While antebellum slavery had often been portrayed as absolute and literal domination, 46 recent historal work has emphasized the surprising incidence of negotiation, in which passive resistance and maroonage, subtly and at the edges, eroded planters' dominance. 47 While the practice of slavery varied immensely between different parts of the South, in a handful of instances slaves contested, occasionally successfully, "the organization of labor, the hours and pace of work, the sexual division of labor, and the composition of the labor force." 4 8
Emancipation strengthened the hand of black labor without fundamentally altering this economic ordering. 49 Negotiations between black laborers and white landowners still occurred against a backdrop of immense inequality. Some planters failed to inform slaves of Emancipation; 50 others attempted to reestablish plantation-like labor arrange- 47. Berlin documents a plethora of fronts upon which resistance took place. Maroonage, for instance, was the practice of fleeing plantations for encampments of former slaves and Indians in the wild. See Berlin, supra note 46, at 169-71 (noting that "in the Chesapeake, slaves found truancy a powerful weapon in the struggle to maintain control over their own lives"). Berlin also notes that slaves expressed considerable antipathy and resistance toward the task system. See id. at 166-67. In Louisiana, a shadow slave economy developed with slaves finding "a measure of independence in the cartage trades." Id. at 201-11; see also id. at 269-72, 276-77 (describing independent slave economies in Maryland and Virginia); Genovese, supra note 46, at 5 ("The slaves of the Old South displayed impressive solidarity and collective resistance to their masters. .. ").
48. Berlin, supra note 46, at 11. Across the South, "slaves created new economies and societies that tried to protect them from the harshest aspects of the slave regime." Id 
PEONAGE AND CONTRACTUAL LIBERTY stressing contracts, the Bureau did contest the views of "southerners . . . unwilling to bargain with free blacks as equals" 5 9 because they persistently feared the threat of black "'insolence' and 'insubordination."' 60 The emphasis on contract nonetheless had pernicious effects. Contracts at first required that "the negro [sic] promises to work for an indefinite time for nothing but his board and clothes, and the white man agrees to do nothing."
61 Nevertheless, the Bureau strongly encouraged blacks to enter year-long contracts. 62 In the South Carolina Sea Islands, for instance, freedmen who had fleetingly tasted land tenure were evicted, and those "freedmen who refused to make contracts were forced to leave." 63 In other parts of the South, such as Alabama, black tenant farmers became peons after being "[d]efrauded of their wages and deprived of mobility either by threats that they could not legally move until their debts were paid or by actual force."
64 Forced work on plantations and mandatory contracts for blacks thus persisted in many parts of the South, intensifying after Redemption. 65 Changes in Southern industry also brought cold comfort. Coal mines and turpentine farms in Georgia, Florida, and Alabama exploited and strengthened the "isoDependency on the state and idleness, claimed the Bureau, vitiated freedom, and fostered a new slavery. The Union army forged fresh contracts for slaves to work on plantations, assigning soldiers to maintain discipline over liberated slaves even before the end of the war. See Stanley, supra note 39, at 35.
The lack of a definitive constitutional resolution of the interpretive question even at this date may help to explain why the United States Army, and in certain cases agents of the Freedman's Bureau, could believe that they were introducing a "free labor" system into the South even as they went about providing for the criminal enforcement, in numerous cases, of the labor contracts of former slaves. lated, low-wage labor market" that was slavery's legacy. 6 6 Racially-targeted convict lease laws and chain gangs fueled state-run factories and the development of the railroads. 6 7 Northern interest in blacks, except as labor for the cotton harvest, waned by the 1880s.68
Redemption legislators also criminalized blacks' refusal to labor, hence ensuring a constant pool of readily-available and cheap labor.
69
Laws restricting the mobility of the black labor force included emigrantagent provisions, 70 contract-enforcement statutes, vagrancy statutes, convict-labor laws, 7 1 and criminal surety systems. 72 The false pretenses and criminal surety laws challenged in the Peonage cases were critical components of this system. 73 In sum, freedom was "a constantly moving target." 74 The free market established by Emancipation and the Freedman's Bureau shaped a "free laboring class" trapped "on the plantations and under the planter class." 75 Nevertheless, a coherent and pervasive social philosophy grew to 66. Lichtenstein, supra note 23, at 10-12; see Oshinsky, supra note 22, at 57-84 (providing a state-by-state account of the industrial uses of convict labor in turpentine camps, coal mines, and the like). The convict lease system endured well into the 1920s, for instance, in the Florida and Alabama coal and turpentine industries. See Lichtenstein, supra note 23, at xv. Nonetheless, the precise relation between racism and industrial development is still contested. Compare Montgomery, supra note 51, at 147 (noting that Southern black labor disputes threatened to rupture relations with the Republican Party), with Wiener, Class Structure and Economic Development, supra note 62, at 365 (arguing that "racism slowed capitalist development in the postwar South almost to a halt").
67. See Lichtenstein, supra note 23, at 28-29 (noting that "existing felony laws were sufficiently severe and arbitrary that blacks found themselves with long penitentiary sentences for petty crimes, and whites seemed to avoid prison sentences altogether").
68. See Kolchin, Business Press, supra note 30, at 187 ("Concern for the cotton crop led the United States Economist to deplore the idleness of Southern Negroes."). Nor did Northern unions spare much thought for black laborers. See Philip S. Foner, The IWW and the Black Worker, 55 J. of Negro Hist. 45, 48 (1970) (noting that "with the exception of the United Mine Workers... the I.W.W. was the only labor organization in the second decade of the twentieth century which stood squarely for the organization of Negro workers on the basis of complete equality").
69. support the preeminence and naturalness of free market relations. This vision of contractual liberty, which convinced many state courts and briefly entranced the United States Supreme Court, is detailed below.
B. The Laissez-Faire Market
Laissez-faire jurisprudence flourished at the confluence of several intellectual and historical tides: Jacksonian individualism, 76 the abolitionists' emphasis on contract as the solvent of antiquated status relations, 7 7 and the need to constrain labor unrest. 78 Economists, such as John Bates Clark, and lawyers, including Thomas Cooley and Christopher Tiedeman, developed a theory of markets and law that justified the status quo by fusing formal equality in contracting with an emphasis on the fairness of voluntary transacting.
79 Laissez-faire's proponents contended that "the market would automatically reward labor and capital in proportion to the 79. Thomas Cooley's 1868 treatise was the first extremely influential treatise to be published in the wake of the Reconstruction Amendments, even though it was initially intended as a commentary on state, not federal, constitutions. See Jacobs, supra note 14, at 22, 29. It "formulated the doctrines of class legislation, of implied limits on state legislative power, and of substantive due process." Id at 27. Christopher Tiedeman's treatise was published in 1886 and was "the most extreme defense of constitutional laissez faire principles ever written. value each had generated." 80 Clark, one of the more sophisticated economists of the period, argued that "in a competitive market, each factor of production... would be paid an amount exactly equal to the value of its marginal product." 81 Prices were "'natural. . . . . [I]t would violate human nature . . . to pay more for a commodity than its labor value" because a buyer could just produce the good for the same output of labor. 8 2 "[T]he market-clearing price would equal the marginal cost to suppliers." 83 Voluntary, private contracts would hence generate fair outcomes without state intervention since parties would never pay more than the marginal value of a commodity. 84 Laissez-faire provided a pre-political ground for elaborating legal norms by claiming to establish a set of "intrinsically just ground rules for economic struggle among private actors." 85 Fairness was predicated on the voluntary nature of transactions, and equality could be guaranteed by ensuring that "no one shall receive from the law special privileges," 8 6 and by ignoring "the fact of a society of unequal individuals."
Clark's model of just market outcomes required that law facilitate market outcomes by "respect[ing] the will of private parties concerning property and contracts." 88 Courts accordingly derived liberty of contract from "immutable principles of justice," established through "'settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England.' "89 Liberty of contract could be extrapolated in particular from 80. Fried, supra note 79, at 2. 81. Id. Of course, Clark's was not the only theory used to justify the free market. 82. Kennedy, Role of Law, supra note 78, at 944 (noting that in sophisticated markets competition prevented prices from diverging from natural levels).
83 the common law's solicitude for property. 90 One supposedly natural and immutable principle forbade "that one man's property, or right to property, shall be taken for the benefit of another." 9 1 Since property was acquired and transmitted through contract, the latter was equally sacrosanct. 92 In addition, constitutional tradition demanded protection of settled property rights againstjealous majorities. 93 Through a promise of formal equality before the law, put into effect via a prohibition on "class legislation," 9 4 and a guarantee of voluntariness in transactions, the Court of pursuing an ordinary calling or trade and of acquiring, holding, and selling property must be embraced the right to make all proper contracts in relation thereto").
90. The recognition of property as a foundational liberty can be traced back to the English common law, and the "customs of freeholders, sanctioned and enforced by the King's justices" out of which "the institutions of property and liberty were fashioned. 93. James Madison argued that "a pure democracy" would be "incompatible with personal security or the rights of property" because of the danger that "a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens." The Federalist No. 10, at 81, 83 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Indeed, "through the republic's first century and a half, property . .. was the paradigm of the constitutionally protected private sphere." Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 1319, 1327-28 (1987) (arguing also that .property seems to have been, above all others, the realm of affairs in which it was feared that factional interest would overcome civic empathy and enlightened deliberation, propelling government toward exploitative and unjust action"); see also Horwitz, supra note 30, at 9 (noting that the "paramount dangers of redistribution of wealth and of levelling" were recognized early in American constitutional thought); Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution 268-70 (1992) (noting an early concern for the representation of property interests in legislatures). This tradition derives from eighteenth-century England, where "[t]he British state... existed to preserve the property and, incidentally, the lives and liberties, of the propertied." E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters 21 (Penguin Books 1990) (1977).
94. 1-2 Cooley, supra note 79, at 393, 740 (noting that legislation that favors one class was "purely arbitrary or capricious" and "a wrongful and highly injurious invasion of property rights"). Throughout the Lochner era, a concern for class legislation can be seen. established "proper limits on government." 95 The "law of the land (or due process of law)" thus became "a substantive limitation upon legislative powers." 9 6 With powerful roots in constitutional tradition, the common law, and the imprimatur of leading social scientists, liberty of contract pierced Supreme Court jurisprudence through a dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases. 97 In contrast to the majority's vision of the Fourteenth Amendment as fundamentally conservative of antebellum federalism, dissenting Justices Field and Bradley presented a vision of liberty of contract as a near-immutable right protected by federal law. 98 The dissenters posited a "right to pursue the ordinary avocations of life without other restraint than such as affects all others," 99 and argued that this right limited the state's ability to regulate under the "police power." 100 A liberty of contract limit on the police power proved congruent with previous understandings of the police power's margins. 10 1 Legislative power to regulate was somewhat analogous to the power to resolve private disputes by adjudicating private rights.
10 2 The Slaughter-House dissenters' view of the market was rapidly adopted by several state courts, which "distinguish [ed] between exercises of the police power and exercises of arbitrary power" favoring one class. 103 pace with the state judiciaries," and later fell short of laissez-faire's extreme applications, it nonetheless integrated notions of formal equality and voluntariness into Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process jurisprudence.
1 0 4
C. The Problem of Coercion
The contrast between the labor markets of Progressive Era America and the formal elegance of laissez-faire jurisprudence provoked an intractable problem: Such jurisprudence invited challenges that wage labor had been coerced. Indeed, such accusations flooded into legislatures, precipitating maximum hour and minimum wage legislation, threatening to disrupt the status quo distribution of surpluses. Mindful that " [b] argains are made only when both parties consent to them"' 0 5 -so coercion invalidated a contract-the Court needed a limiting principle for coercion claims that could choke redistributive legislation and maintain laissez-faire's ideological coherence.1 0 6
Coercion is difficult to account for systematically. At least three elementary definitions of coercion-based on efficiency, subjective experience, and normative commitments-provide recognizable, but unstable, definitions. A brief survey reveals problems with all three approaches. First, a court concerned with efficiency might contend that when "the amount buyers gain from more favorable obligations, measured by the maximum buyers would be willing to pay for those obligations, [is greater than] the amount sellers would lose," a contract is voluntary.
10 7 However, this test for coercion is underinclusive' 0 8 and difficult to execute in 106. Cf. Horwitz, supra note 30, at 33 ("[E]very interference with the contract system-such as the regulation of the terms and conditions of a labor contract-was treated as an attack on the very idea of the market as a natural and neutral institution for distributing rewards.").
107. Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 21 (1993) . This is simply the assumption of mutual gain articulated in some detail.
108. For instance, where "Y is drowning (through no one's fault), and X refuses to rescue him unless he agrees to have his leg amputated." Id. at 34. David Hume reached the same conclusion:
Can we seriously say that a poor peasant or artisan has a free choice to leave his country when he knows no foreign language or manners and lives from day to day by the small wages which he acquires? We may as well assert that a man, by remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the master, though he was carried on board while asleep and must leap into the ocean and perish the moment he leaves her.
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110 This definition of coercion thus fluctuates between victims. Since endorsement of a subjective understanding of coercion would precipitate "a failure to make rules understandable [and] such frequent change in the rules that the subject cannot orient his action by them," it must be rejected for rule of law reasons.
1 ' Finally, a normative account of coercion might establish a baseline to distinguish benefits and harms, independent of plaintiffs' subjective perceptions. While there are several contenders for this baseline, through a clear precommitment, courts could establish a predictable rule.
' 1 2 In practice however, a stable baseline is difficult to formulate, as Rev. 563, 603 (1982) (noting that many efficiency arguments rest "on empirical data that no one seems to have ready at hand").
The efficiency model has another difficulty. All transactions can be described as pervasively coercive. In the putatively voluntary transaction, "each [party] yields in order to avoid the disadvantage to which the other can subject him. That is, he yields to a threat." Hale, Freedom through Law, supra note 105, at 9. Even if A is willing to part with her money for B's goods, only the threat of B's withholding forces A to part with her dollars. If any trade is tainted by coercion, the policy decision to define one transaction as "coercive" and another as "voluntary" cannot rest on the mere presence of coercion. Contra )). Hence, the Court would have to distinguish between (a) acts one has a right to do which are coercive and (b) acts one has a right to do which are not coercive, without a principled way to distinguish between the two.
Finally, asking whether the act proffered is a benefit or a burden to the victim also produces rule of law problems. "Benefit" and "burden" are "relative terms [that] refer to a change in an agent's condition." Westen, supra note 110, at 572. stereotypes. Once the Court ceased viewing a particular category as weak, protective regulation could no longer be justified. 1 16 This model for coercion had advantages for a court attempting to limit the redistributive impact of legislation, since it meant that only already-marginalized groups with little political muscle, such as women and African-Americans, merited protective legislation. Most of the redistributive legislation that would be demanded by populist legislators could thus be rejected.
The next Part explores the reasoning used by the Court in several Lochner-era cases and argues that when a regulation's validity depended on a judgment about coercion (and not health or safety), the Court engaged in an imaginative construction of persons it believed could be coerced. The final Part looks at the spillover of this idea into the definition of "involuntary servitude" in the Peonage cases.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S UNDERSTANDING OF COERCION IN SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CASES (1905-1923)
In this Part, cases from Lochner onward are examined for evidence of this model of coercion. Legislation was vindicated in many substantive due process challenges because the Court found valid health and safety reasons or through extensions of nuisance doctrine.
1 17 The following account of coercion does not apply to such cases. Furthermore, the theory was not held by all members of the Court; 118 nor was it the only theory expressed in majority opinions during the period in question. 119 Rather, 1 20 Lochner invalidated a New York statute providing that no employee would work in a biscuit, bread, or cake bakery establishment more than sixty hours in any one week, or more than ten hours in any one day, because the law burdened the "general right to make a contract [which is] part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution." 12 1
An initial criterion Justice Peckham, writing for the Court, identified for regulation was the possibility of weakness and incapacity on the part of the protected class. Regulation would be permitted when those protected were "not equal in intelligence and capacity to men in other trades . . .
[o]r . . . able to assert their rights and care for themselves . . . "122 Only "wards of the State" merited a solicitude that could be manifested as regulation. 123 Hence, only the personal incapacity of a contracting party, a lack of intelligence or inability to function within the market, undermined "the right to purchase and sell labor upon such terms as the parties may agree" and could as a result justify state coercion.' 24 In Lochner, Peckham felt no need even to inquire into the status of the bakers as fully capable contracting parties; their capacity was obvious. The task ofjudging consisted, for Peckham, not in the examination of disputable facts, but in "the objective task of drawing lines" by classifying bakers as a non-coercible class.' Rather than reviewing the validity of evidence proffered for the health justification or reaching, as Justice Harlan did, to the authority of textbooks and social science reports, Justice Peckham took judicial notice of the Court's "common knowledge." 1 2 7 In assessing the risks of the bakery trade, he noted that "[t]o the common understanding the trade of a baker has never been regarded as an unhealthy one.
' 128 Justice Peckham asked whether in his understanding of bakers solicitude was warranted, hence measuring and evaluating legislative judgment against the Court's, not the legislature's, common knowledge. 129 Both of Peckham's lines of reasoning thus rested on a comparison between the New York statute and the Court's own understanding of the world.
In Adair v. United States, coercive regulation could not be justified because a class conceived by the Justices to be weak was unavailable. 130 In his opinion for the majority in Adair, Justice Harlan abandoned his nuanced, contextual Lochner approach 13 1 and rejected federal legislation banning yellow-dog contract clauses (which forbade employees from joining unions), in disregard of labor's well-known bargaining weakness. The opinion is remarkable for its positive disavowal of factual inquiry: "We will not indulge in any such [factual] conjectures, nor make them, in whole or in part, the basis of our decision." 128. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 59; cf. Horwitz, supra note 30, at 30 (noting that the Court had to determine "whether the particular occupation in question was 'in and of itself' unhealthy").
129. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 59-60 ("But are we all ... at the mercy of legislative majorities?"). The Court then launches into a parade of horribles that would result if the bakers' claim was granted. One way of looking at this argument is as a rule of law concern relating to the subjective nature of coercion. If anyone's version of coercion were valid, Justice Peckham argued, and subjective definitions of coercion were acted upon by the legislature, then there would be no predicting what sort of laws would be passed; indeed, the legislative power would become, in effect, wholly arbitrary. Justice Holmes responded to this rule of law problem: Where the majority acts, Holmes implied, there is no problem with the rule of law, since logically, the legislative will is that of the majority, so the majority will know what type of laws to expect. See id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (noting the right of a majority to embody its opinions in law). 132. Adair, 208 U.S. at 179. Contra id. at 191 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that the statute "simply prohibits the more powerful party to exact certain undertakings, or to threaten dismissal or unjustly discriminate on certain grounds"). Harlan searched for a "legal or logical" basis forjudgment1 3 3 Such legal and logical categories grew from the stock of judicial common sense, which told the Court that railway workers were not predisposed to coercion. Rather, they were a dangerous class with potentially redistributive aspirations.
134 By refusing to move beyond the Court's preconceived categories, Justice Harlan confidently grounded his decision on a formal "equality of right" that, in practice, was a nullity. 135 Similarly, in Coppage v. Kansas, a challenge to a state law that penalized anti-union contractual clauses, Justice Pitney could establish, upon "a little reflection," the "self-evident" impossibility of remedying distributional inequality. 136 Reflection turned not on the context of the law but on Pitney's intuitive categorization of the world. Tellingly, the Kansas Supreme Court similarly adverted to "common knowledge" in upholding the law before the Supreme Court took the case.' 3 7 By appealing to "the nature of things," Justice Pitney suggested that laborers' coercion by employers was not a cognizable form of coercion, and so could not be remedied by the state. 138 However, one labor regulation case, Holden v. Hardy, deviates from this pattern. 139 Holden involved health and safety regulations for miners, which the Court principally vindicated as extensions of the state's power to regulate unusual activities under nuisance doctrines. 140 Justice Brown nonetheless noted that the relation of miners to owners was one tinged by coercion, since "laborers are practically constrained to obey" owners. 141 Acknowledging the coercion claim even so obliquely in Holden may have been possible because the Court knew that the law applied only to a small group of workers 14 2 and hence could not be the basis of broad redistribution.
133. Id. at 178 (arguing that a "legal or logical connection" with interstate commerce is absent). Justice Harlan here analyzed the viability of the statute under the Commerce Clause power: He could not find the requisite "connection" because he cannot see the railroad worker in Adair as oppressed, and hence could not see the need for federal intervention.
134. See id. at 179 (refusing to impute to Congress "the purpose to accord to one class of wage-earners privileges withheld from another class of wage-earners").
135. Id. at 175 ("[Tlhe employer and the employ6 have equality of right, and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract....").
136 145 In Muller, the Court upheld an Oregon statute that forbade the employment of women for more than ten hours in any one day, 146 despite having rejected such a minimum wage law in Lochner three years earlier. 14 7 Women's potential to be coerced was not factually weighed, but asserted on the basis of universal truths. Justice Brewer's opinion is not so much an analysis of the disadvantages facing women in economic life as a disquisition into an essential nature of women, understood as inherently incapable of protecting themselves. The "fact" of female inferiority could be deduced through 'judicial cognizance" of "general knowledge."' 48 Women's competitive disadvantage in life was "obvious," female dependency revealed by mere "history." 1 49 Female incapacity followed from an inherent "disposition and habits of life which will operate against a full assertion of . . . rights."' 5 0 Thus, common knowledge modulated sub silentio into established fact in the course of the opinion.
The majority's reliance on self-evident propositions suggests a mistrust of factual evidence. Indeed, the Court expressed skepticism about the value of legislative and social fact to constitutional interpretation. Legislation was only evidence of "widespread belieft-hence hardly "authorit [ative] ."l51 Legislative will required verification against the selfevident and timeless truths embodied by the Court's categorization of the world. Justice Brewer, rather than drawing from Louis Brandeis's fact- heavy brief, 152 contrasted the "unchanging" Constitution with "debated and debatable" facts. 153 According to Professor Fiss, he used this "distancing technique" to establish the Court's mistrust of mere facts: 154 Brewer's basic cognitive tools thus derived from his preconceived categorization of the world, not the facts available to the Court.
15 5 The Court applied the same presumptions in Bradwell v. Illinois, endorsing a prohibition on women's entry to the bar. 156 EvenJustices Field and Bradley, who had stoutly protested barriers to entry to other professions, acquiesced on the basis of "the constitution of the family organization" as provided by "the law of the Creator."
1 57 From such common knowledge they could deduce that "It]he paramount destiny and mission of woman [are] to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother." 158 In Adkins, on the other hand, the Court invalidated on substantive due process grounds a minimum wage law for women because "differences [between the sexes] have now come almost, if not quite, to the vanishing point."
15 9 Justice Sutherland reached once more to "common thought and usage" to assess women's status. 160 As in Muller and Bradwell, the crucial metric for whether a class could be subject to special protec- tion was the Court's general knowledge. Between Bradwell and Adkins, the Justices' understanding of the categorization of women transformed, migrating across the line that bounded those classes that could be coerced. Beyond the scope of this Note's inquiry is the question of whether this shift was caused by fundamental cultural changes or a peculiarity local to the law. 161 Adkins, Bradwell, and Muller hence support the thesis that the Court's perception of a protected group's inferiority could on occasion, but not invariably, justify regulatory deviations from the freedom of contract norm. 162 The Court applied 'common knowledge' to distinguish classes that could be coerced from those that could not. This test allowed the Court to construct its own understanding of victims' subjective experience of coercion and to deny contrary factual evidence. Characterizing the Court's behavior as "paternalistic," 163 however, obscures the Justices' conscious and principled neutrality that strove to rise above contestable facts to universal truths. These cases, despite their ultimately questionable results, evince a genuine desire for neutral, apolitical, and shared terrain upon which to ground decisions.
III. DEFINING COERCION IN THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT

A. The Peonage Cases and the Judicial Categorization of Blacks
This Part considers the Peonage cases. In the prevailing academic view, the Peonage cases "advanced the rights of blacks and gave realistic scope to the Thirteenth Amendment's protection against involuntary servitude. 1 64 In contrast, this Part argues that these cases are best understood as extensions of the Lochner Court's approach to coercion, which 162. These cases do not, however, prove that the Court's recognition of vulnerability necessitated the conclusion that the Court would provide assistance, only that the Court could chose to furnish assistance to the vulnerable.
163. Soifer, supra note 15, at 277, (arguing that the "Court enthusiastically thrust itself into the role of the ultimate paternalist"). [Vol. 101:351 established narrow categories of people understood to be weak, incapable, and hence meriting state protection. Assumptions of black incapacity constituted the foundation of the legal attack on peonage. Thus, the victory against peonage, such as it was, reinforced deep presumptions of black workers' incapacity. Further, the Peonage cases impeded other claims of coercion, by limiting their availability to those willing to selfidentify as black. Since such identification risked a loss of social capitalwhat might be called the "wages of whiteness"-the legal construction of a gendered and race-conscious coercion constituted a barrier to similar legal claims by those elements of the working class with sufficient political power to challenge the distribution of rents from industrial development. Stereotypes of blacks' incapacity abounded, constituting part of an ideology that justified oppressive labor laws including vagrancy and criminal surety laws.
1 6 7 While blacks were crucial to the South's economic development, they never penetrated sectors of the Southern economy, such as textile factories, where owners believed that white labor was required. 168 Professor Schmidt argues that Bailey and Reynolds are best understood as emanations of a Progressive concern for "economic individualism and freedom of choice," and a liberty of contract doctrine that saw barriers to leaving employment as substantive due process violations. Bickel & Schmidt, supra note 21, at 832-33 ("A laborer's freedom of contract... necessarily included two precious, though necessarily limited, freedoms: the freedom to change jobs or move on in search of a better one, and the freedom to respond to abusive or unreasonable demands by walking off the job.").
165. "Chattel slavery provided white workers with a touchstone against which to weigh their fears and a yardstick to measure their reassurance." David R. Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness 66 (1991) (quoting W.E.B. DuBois) [hereinafter Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness]. In other works, Roediger has shown how white working class identity has been fabricated "in partly racial terms." David R. Roediger, Towards the Abolition of Whiteness: Essays on Race, Politics, and Working Class History 25 (1994).
166. Blacks had long been viewed as "a race of... laborers." C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career ofJim Crow 80 (1957). Northern white workers evoked the image of black slavery to protest wage labor: In 1830s New York, they evoked images of slavery to express disgust at restrictions upon their freedom to unionize, inventing terms such as "white nigger" and "work like a nigger" to protest the new industrialization and its suppression of artisans' freedoms. Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness, supra note 165, at 68.
167. "The conventional wisdom regarding black labor insisted that without supervision the black farmer would be certain to fail as an independent farmer." Sutch & Ransom, supra note 55, at 329. Not that such views were ever universal. A meager handful of officials in the Freedman's Bureau did think the freedmen capable of meaningful and independent work. See, e.g., Letter from C. W. Buckley to General C. Schurz (Aug. 168. See Lichtenstein, supra note 23, at 39 ("Textile operators' reluctance to hire black convicts stemmed from the racist belief that African-Americans were inherently unsuited to indoor factory labor .... ").
"The putative inborn capacity of the one or another 'races' was commonly invoked to explain everything [from labor conditions to political participation] ."169 Restrictive Southern labor laws that fostered peonage were premised upon this assumption, and through regular application, ensured the foundering of black economic hopes. 170 The Court most likely knew of the Jim Crow system of forced labor, and its pernicious impact, particularly upon blacks: "The Progressive era [press] delighted in throwing the light of publicity on hidden horrors in American life."
171
The Justice Department's report on peonage also identified the invidious racial impact of seemingly neutral laws such as the criminal surety and false pretenses statutes.
172 Indeed, the Attorney General's amicus brief, which accompanied Bailey's first attempt at the Supreme Court, recounted sufficient detail to convince Justice Harlan of the need to accept the case. 173 Hence, the Court was almost certainly aware of the racial content and the pervasiveness of the peonage laws.
In interpreting other parts of the Reconstruction Amendments, the Court refused to remedy racial subjugation.
174 Plessy v. Ferguson, for instance, found no remedy in the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause when "one race [is] inferior to another socially." 1 75 Indeed, the Plessy Court placed responsibility for the psychological effects of segregation upon blacks. 176 In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court refused to find in the Thirteenth Amendment protection from private discrimina-169. Foner, Story of Freedom, supra note 36, at 131. 170. Weiner, Class Structure and Economic Development, supra note 62, at 370 (noting that studies reflect "fairly extensive reliance on the law to repress labor").
171 This exception can be explained by the needs of a laissez-faire ideology straining under the weight of white proletarian coercion claims. Involuntary servitude in the Thirteenth Amendment proved fortuitously congruent with the notion of coercion in liberty of contract. White supremacy, on the other hand, was unaffected by the Peonage cases because only minor components of the Southern labor system were invalidated, 180 and because the cultural image of black incapacity prevailed.
The Legal Status of Peonage Statutes and the Use of Criminal Sanctions Upon Breach of an Employment
Contract. -A preliminary objection to reopening the inquiry into the Peonage cases might be as follows: Surely the laws at issue in Bailey and Reynolds, by imposing criminal sanctions for a worker's breach of an employment contract, constituted peonage by restraining labor under pain of criminal punishment. They were thus patently invalid. Why then the need to explain?
The idea that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibited criminal sanctions for contract breach was not clearly accepted at the time the Peonage cases were decided. 181 Peonage had been defined narrowly by the federal courts to require "indebtedness,"' 82 with criminal sanctions for contract breach traditionally distinct from debt. Indentured servitude, which applied criminal sanctions on breach of contract, persisted at the time in 181. This is certainly not to contend that there would be no arguments available against the use of criminal sanctions upon contract breach. The Supreme Court in Robertson v. Baldwin distinguished between involuntary servitude which can exist "lawfully as a punishment for crime of which the party shall have been duly convicted," as opposed to criminalizing violation of a "private contract voluntarily made." 165 U.S. 275, 292 (1897) (HarlanJ., dissenting); see also Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 175-76 (1908) ("[I]t cannot be .. .that an employer is under any legal obligation, against his will, to retain an employt .... any more than an employL can be compelled, against his will, to remain in the personal service of another.").
England, 1 8 3 and had been widely accepted in the North until the 1820s and 1830s.1 8 4 At the beginning of the twentieth century, three Northern states-Maine, Minnesota, and Michigan-had false pretenses statutes, similar to the one invalidated in Bailey. 18 5 Further, despite federal prohibitions forbidding the importation of foreign contract labor, a highly organized and highly coercive system of debt-based labor prospered alongside the growth of the Western railroads. 185. See Steinfeld, supra note 58, at 157 (noting that these states had "false pretense labor contract statutes of their own, aimed at enforcing the labor agreements of white workers who had received transportation advances to remote lumbering, mining, or railroad construction sites"). But cf. Schmidt, supra note 164, at 705 ("[T]he longaccepted position of the Anglo-American criminal law is that an individual breaching a contract should not be subject to criminal penalties.").
186 194 Finally, neither of the statutes at issue in the Peonage cases directly penalized contract breach. The false pretenses law in Bailey made acceptance of an advance and the subsequent failure to repay it prima facie evidence of fraud, while the criminal surety law in Reynolds allowed convicted criminals to have a third party pay their fines in return for the promise of labor.' 9 5 Both could have fallen within the exception to the Thirteenth Amendment, which explicitly permitted involuntary servitude "as a punishment for crime." 1 96 A 1867 federal anti-peonage statute forbade "the holding of any person to service or labor to pay a debt due from the laborer to the employer, when such employ6 desires to leave the employment before his debt is paid off.' 9 7 Southern peonage laws, on the other hand, included a finding of criminality and rested on more than mere indebtedness. 198 Pursuant to this logic, Alabama District Court Judge Thomas Goode Jones, one of the leaders of the Justice Department's attack on peonage, 199 upheld the false pretenses law later struck down in Bailey, on the theory that it did not "coerce the performance of civil obligations by criminal penalties. '200 At the beginning of the Lochner era then, the "place of compulsion in a free market economy," was still an open question. 20 ' Understanding the malignant consequences of the peonage laws demanded a contextual analysis of their impact. If the Court had engaged in the formalist analysis of Adair or Coppage, it is easy to imagine the Peonage cases coming out the other way. Given the Court's proclivity for formalist, acontextual argument and its unwillingness to protect minorities in other cases, the question can legitimately be posed: Why did the Court decide the way it did?
3. The Peonage cases. -This section suggests that the Peonage cases were in fact characterized by the same sort of acontextual analysis used in other Lochner-era substantive due process cases. Distrusting factual information and the briefs, the Court relied on its stereotypes of black labor to strike down the false pretenses statute in Bailey and the criminal surety law in Reynolds. 20 2 The use of these techniques, similar to the methodology used in substantive due process cases, provides evidence that the framework of laissez-faire was the starting point for analysis in the Peonage cases. Hence, the Peonage cases should be seen as appendages to laissez-faire doctrine, which helps explain their anomalous status in race relations law.
While in Adair and Coppage, the Court accepted formalist readings of statutes, in Bailey and Reynolds, it engaged in a reconstruction of what it believed (more or less accurately) to be the statute's impact based on its own preconceptions of black labor. 203 In Bailey, Justice Hughes refused to accept Alabama's insistence upon the formal legitimacy of the false pretenses law, which allowed juries to convict workers of fraudulently accepting advances absent evidence by creating a presumption of fraudulent intent. 20 4 Nor did he look at the actual operation of the statute. As in Muller, the decision provides no sign of reliance on the briefs, which here would have included the Justice Department's detailed factual reports on peonage and Bailey's lawyers' insistence upon the racial component of the laws. 20 5 injure or defraud." 20 8 Justice Hughes imagined Bailey as "stripped" of his natural rights and "exposed" to the danger of conviction.
20 9 In spite of Justice Holmes's protest that evidence of the statute's de facto operation was lacking even in the case at hand, the Court imagined the statute's "natural and inevitable effect," in a way that it had been unwilling to do in Adair or Coppage. 210 Further, the Court could have invalidated only the particular application of the statute before it, instead of striking down the entire statute. Indeed, Justice Holmes, in denying a hearing in the first Bailey case, suggested that the statute's flaw, if any, lay in its application rather than its formulation.
2 11 The Court knew that the law's targets were black peons, described elsewhere as "helpless and pathetic." 2 12
Since blacks fit its preconceived notions of incapacity, it was willing to see the laws as extensions of private coercion.
13
Further, in Reynolds, the Court performed a similar analysis on a convict surety statute, which allowed black criminals to have their fines paid by white farmers in exchange for labor. 214 Justice Day refused to endorse a purely formalist understanding of the statute that legitimated the imposition of a penalty pursuant to a criminal conviction. He contended that the surety was a new contract, not part of a state punishment, even though the state, through its statute, branded the surety contracts as punishment. 214. In Reynolds, one Ed Rivers was convicted of petty larceny. To pay his fine and court costs required sixty-eight days in jail; rather, Rivers chose to work in a surety contract for nine months and twenty-four days. Deserting before its completion, Rivers was rearrested, fined again (this time, a penny, but with $87.75 court costs), and again rereleased on a surety, this time for more than fourteen months. See Cohen, supra note 69, at 54. 4. The Holmes Opinions. -Justice Holmes's Bailey dissent and Reynolds concurrence provide the strongest evidence for this reading. By adopting an "uncharacteristically formalistic" approach, 218 Holmes emphasized that if the statute applied to all contracts, it would be valid. Logically then, it was not the statute itself, but the fact that it was applied primarily to one vulnerable group that had persuaded the majority. Indeed, in his first Bailey decision, he had noted that the false pretenses law would be invalid only if "a certain class in the community was mainly affected." 2 19 Absent this evidence, Holmes implied, the Court lacked reasons to invalidate the law. 220 proposition that the state's stamp of approval was lacking in these schemes was thus inaccurate.
216. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915) (noting that it is "impossible to uphold freedom of contract and the right of private property without at the same time recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary result of the exercise of those rights").
217. While whites, especially Italian immigrants, were also subject to coercive false pretenses statutes in other parts of the country, the Court's adjudication of a case involving blacks probably made the striking down of the statute easier to justify. See 222 Holmes thus contrasted the obvious racial content of the law with the fact that the majority had gone out of its way to deny this racial content proper legal significance. This ironic contrast suggests that Holmes did not take the majority's denial of the importance of race at face value. Rather, he believed that racial factors had been determinative for the majority. By stressing the obvious racial context of the law, Holmes was calling the majority's bluff, implicitly challenging their putatively race-neutral decision.
23
Holmes thus indicated his belief that the Court was importing subjective judgments, specifically, its beliefs that blacks were weak and merited protection, to invalidate a legislative decision. Justice Holmes's Bailey dissent might be read as an attempt to embarrass the Court, which was leery of inflaming fresh tensions between North and South, by parading and mocking its implicit use of racial categories.
224
In Reynolds, Justice Holmes noted that only "impulsive people with little intelligence or foresight" would be caught in the folds of criminal surety.
22 5 These words were "the shibboleths of respectable racism in moderate Northern discourse," 226 and indicated his belief that the law was being struck down, not necessarily because it was inherently coercive, but because it was generally applied to a weak and incapable people, who needed protection from the potentially harsh outcomes of the market. One biographer, G. Edward White, suggests that Holmes might have distinguished between the permissible criminalization of breaches of labor contracts, and an impermissible taking "advantage" of "impulsive" labor- 223. Cf. Soifer, supra note 15, at 272 ("Holmes accused the majority of tacitly assuming that Alabama juries would be prejudiced.").
224. Professor Schmidt notes that the Court was careful to stimulate "the impetus for sectional reconciliation" and that in every case in which it struck down a piece ofJim Crow, it avoided "any implication of judicial disapproval." Bickel & Schmidt, supra note 21, at 982, 987 (discussing the involuntary servitude, franchise restriction, and segregation cases). Schmidt considers but rejects the suggestion that the choice of Hughes as writer of the Bailey decision, instead of Harlan, who had already professed strong feelings on race, was an effort on the latter's part to minimize perceived conflict within the Court over the issue of race. See 228 Hence, in both cases, the Holmes opinions illuminate a consciousness of the racial context, and his belief that it was crucial for the majorities' decisions. Later peonage decisions, perhaps influenced by Holmes's irony, acknowledged the salience of race.
229
In conclusion, Bailey and Reynolds do not need to be seen as anomalies in the era of'judicial hostility to racial claims. Rather, they transpired at a moment when laissez-faire ideology urgently required a definition of unfree labor to staunch majoritarian cries for redistributive legislation. The Court's solution to this problem-permitting coercion claims from only those groups it understood as weak-seeped into the Peonage cases. Where minorities' claims had been rejected in Plessy v. Ferguson 230 and the Civil Rights Cases, 23 1 the pleas of black laborers were heard in Bailey and Reynolds because such recognition proved congruent with the ideological necessities of laissez-faire. For an instant, black subordination was remedied, not for the sake of justice or equality, but for ideological coherence. Other scholars have noted similar contemporaneous moments of interest convergence. According to Professor David Bernstein, freedom of contract jurisprudence also "protected African Americans from facially neutral legislation that restricted their access to, and mobility in, the labor market." 232 He concludes that such protection was "a fortuitous by-product of Lochnerism's hostility to special-interest legislation rather than a product of a conscious decision by the courts to protect these groups. ' 23 3 A focus upon the Peonage cases, however, counsels for a less sanguine view of fortuitous judicial aid.
23 4 The practical effects of decisions concerning peonage for blacks were limited since "peonage continued, not only in Alabama but throughout the South." 235 The Pe- Kozminski concerned the criminal prosecution of farmers who had held by force and threats, and then extracted labor from, two mentally handicapped individuals. Justice O'Connor held that the standard for involuntary servitude under these statutes was the "use or threatened use of physical or legal coercion." 242 Noting that the "exact range of conditions [the Amendment] prohibits is hard[ ] to define," provoking problems of notice in the use of criminal sanctions, 243 she "abruptly concluded that psychological coercion would not satisfy its test." 24 4 Further, she rejected definitions of involuntary servitude that encompassed psychological coercion or "slavelike conditions" because of the same rule of law problem. 245 Her standard thus attempted to exclude uncertainty in the definition of coercion by avoiding a subjective definition. 246 Nevertheless, it is far from clear that the majority's standard does exclude subjective judgments. Defining legal coercion requires that courts confront a baseline problem: Determining when the exercise of a legal right is coercive. 247 One problem is that a law might be only part of the reason for accepting work. Where the law plays a part in coercing work, but other factors also play a role, the Court might have to determine whether the subjective reasons for submitting to the threat pertained to the exercise of the legal right or to non-legal factors. 248 However, Justice O'Connor's opinion contains sub rosa strands of another analytic technique for closeting coercion, one with roots in the Lochner era. Rather than examining the plaintiffs subjective view of the coercion in question, the Court categorized victims into different classes based on the Court's conception of whether the victim was suitably weak and incapable. Justice O'Connor gave several examples of 18 U.S.C.
§ 241 and § 1584 violations: "children ... stranded in large, hostile cities"; a "child who is told he can go home late at night in the dark through a strange area"; "an incompetent [threatened with] institutionalization" and "an immigrant [threatened] with deportation." 249 On the other hand, "a parent who coerced an adult son or daughter into working in the family business by threatening withdrawal of affection," could not be described as coercive. 250 Religious and political leaders who obtain "work without pay" or "personal services" from adult followers are also excluded from involuntary servitude prosecution. 251 Finally, an at-will firing was a "beneficial" situation that would be compromised by coercion liability.
25 2 A common thread illuminates these examples: Only plaintiffs with special vulnerabilities, or who lack capacity, are protected. 253 The "vulnerabilities of the victim" and "evidence of other means of coercion" are not only "relevant," but, given the difficulty of articulating a baseline for legal coercion, may be determinative. 254 Courts following Kozminski will inevitably look to these examples, even though they are dicta, to identify legal coercion. The First Circuit, the only circuit yet to analyze Kozminski extensively, has noted the "evidentiary role of the victim's 'special 248. For instance, if an immigrant accepted work rather than returning home, and was threatened by an employer with a loss of work authorization, would it make a difference to the Court in a coercion analysis if the immigrant in this case was a welleducated professional from Canada, or a manual laborer from a poorer country which was suffering from a major civil war? It seems unavoidable that these contextual factors, besides the type of legal pressure applied, would make a difference in the Court's adjudication.
249. 487 U.S. at 947-48. 250. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 949 (emphasis added). Justice O'Connor emphasizes that this example arose in oral argument, suggesting its importance to the Court. 251. Id. 252. Id. at 950 (agreeing that "[t]he most ardent believer in civil rights legislation might not think that cause would be advanced by permitting the awful machinery of the criminal law to be brought into play whenever an employee asserts that his will to quit has been subdued by a threat which seriously affects his future welfare") (quoting United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 487 (2d Cir. 1964)).
253. This occurred in Kozminski. Even though the case was reversed and remanded, the Court recognized the special weakness of the two "mentally retarded" men held by the Kozminskis. According to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the I.Q.s of the two farmhands were 67 and 60. See United States v. Kozminski, 821 F.2d 1186, 1188 (6th Cir. 1987).
254. Kozminski. 487 U.S. at 952.
